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We know that criminal defendants who plead guilty receive lower 
sentences than those convicted at trial, but there’s widespread 
disagreement about why. One camp of scholars believes this 
plea-trial differential represents a deeply troubling and coercive 
penalty; a second believes it’s merely a freedom-enhancing discount; 
and a third denies any meaningful distinction between the two at all. 
One reason for this disagreement is theoretical—it’s not at all clear 
what these concepts mean. Another is empirical—in the absence of 
precise conceptual definitions, we lack relevant data because 
scholars don’t know what to look for when searching for evidence of 
penalties and discounts in the real world. 
This Article seeks to bring greater theoretical and empirical 
clarity to the debate. To that end, I propose a theoretical definition of 
plea discounts and trial penalties. Applying this framework to the 
existing literature, I argue that there is strong theoretical and 
anecdotal evidence of trial penalties but little systematic empirical 
evidence. Nearly all of the statistical research has only studied the 
plea-trial differential; because both discounts and penalties are 
equally consistent with the existence of such a differential, the 
literature cannot distinguish between them. 
To develop a robust statistical test of the discount and penalty 
theories, we need to look elsewhere—where they make different 
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predictions about prosecutorial behavior. Contrary to the views of 
the third camp of scholars—who maintain that’s impossible—I show 
that discounts and penalties are only indistinguishable if we assume 
litigation costs and acquittal probabilities are static. But they aren’t. 
They change all the time, and as a result, the discount and penalty 
theories diverge from each other, predicting different prosecutorial 
behavior. I argue that this theoretical insight might be used to 
develop an empirical test to help assess the prevalence and intensity 
of discounts and penalties in criminal court. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Everyone agrees that a criminal defendant who pleads guilty 
receives a lower sentence than if convicted at trial. But why? Does 
that difference represent a plea discount or a trial penalty? Much 
rides on this question. If the plea-trial differential represents a 
discount, plea bargaining merely expands the range of choices 
available to defendants. But if it represents a penalty, then plea 
bargaining—a system that helps produce the vast majority of 
criminal convictions in this country—is a deeply troubling and 
coercive practice that punishes defendants for exercising their 
constitutional rights. 1  This is plea bargaining’s greatest problem; 
even those scholars who have defended plea bargaining recognize the 
need to assume penalties away.2 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, there’s widespread scholarly disagreement 
about plea discounts and trial penalties. The dominant view among 
criminal law scholars appears to be that the plea-trial differential 
routinely represents a penalty. 3 But a second group has taken the 
opposite position, that it represents a discount.4 And a third group 
 
 1. See Josh Bowers, Plea Bargaining’s Baselines, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1083, 1091–93 (2016) 
(describing how trial penalties coerce defendants). 
 2. For a lengthy string cite, see sources cited infra note 46. 
 3. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to 
Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1138 (2011) (“The expected post-trial sentence 
is . . . like the sticker price for cars: only an ignorant, ill-advised consumer would view full price as the 
norm and anything less as a bargain.”); Albert W. Alschuler, Lafler and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for 
a Festering Wound, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 673, 685–86 (2013); Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining 
Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2668 (2013) (“[The criminal justice system] punishes many individuals 
convicted after trial much more harshly than those convicted after a guilty plea, in what has been 
characterized as a ‘trial tax.’”); Máximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform 
of Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 246 (2006) 
(noting that threatening “unfair” trial sentences to encourage guilty pleas is a “common phenomenon in 
the American criminal justice system”); John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the 
Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L. REV. 204, 213 (1979) (noting that American plea bargaining has a “terrible 
attribute that . . . makes it coercive and unjust: the sentencing differential by which the accused is 
threatened with an increased sanction for conviction after trial by comparison with that which is offered 
for confession and waiver”); Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 47 (“[O]ne can conclude that in most cases the 
prosecutor unilaterally determines what concessions the defendant will receive for his guilty plea 
because of the state’s ability to punish those defendants who do not plead.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Scott W. Howe, The Value of Plea Bargaining, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 599, 619–26 (2005) 
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denies any meaningful distinction between the two at all, believing 
that discounts and penalties merely represent “two sides of the same 
coin.”5 
One reason for the disagreement is that these concepts are often 
poorly defined.6 While scholars refer to them all the time, they often 
intend different things. Sometimes scholars use “trial penalty” and 
 
(arguing that plea bargaining critics have failed to provide evidence that prosecutors do in fact threaten 
penalties); Thomas W. Church, Jr., In Defense of “Bargain Justice,” 13 L. & SOC’Y REV. 509, 519–20 
(1979) (explicitly assuming that the plea-trial differential represents a discount); Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Criminal Procedure As a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 309 (1983) (“The defendant, who 
buys the plea, pays by surrendering his right to impose costs on the prosecutor by demanding trial and 
by surrendering his chance of acquittal at trial.”); Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 186 (2012) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“The Court today embraces the sporting-chance theory of criminal law, in which the State 
functions like a conscientious casino-operator, giving each player a fair chance to beat the house, that is, 
to serve less time than the law says he deserves. And when a player is excluded from the tables, his 
constitutional rights have been violated. I do not subscribe to that theory.”); Steven S. Nemerson, 
Coercive Sentencing, 64 MINN. L. REV. 669, 698–99 (1980); United States v. Wiley, 184 F. Supp. 679, 
685 (N.D. Ill. 1960) (“[I]t is incorrect, in my opinion, to say . . . that a ‘more severe sentence’ is 
imposed on a defendant who stands trial. Rather, it seems more correct to me to say that the defendant 
who stands trial is sentenced without leniency according to law.”). 
 5. Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings, 82 TUL. 
L. REV. 1237, 1243 n.27 (2008) (“Plea discounts and trial penalties are simply two sides of the same 
coin, a logical conclusion many courts have reluctantly reached.”); see also Ronald Wright & Marc 
Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 83 n.207 (2002) (“Massive plea 
benefits can also be seen in a logical mirror as a massive penalty for going to trial.”); John C. Coffee, 
Jr., “Twisting Slowly in the Wind”: A Search for Constitutional Limits on Coercion of the Criminal 
Defendant, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 211, 251 (“The defendant facing the plea/trial decision is facing an 
essentially either/or decision, and in this binary context, a credit and a penalty are too reciprocally 
related to pretend that crediting one who pleads guilty is not equivalent to penalizing him for going to 
trial.”); Comment, The Influence of Defendant’s Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentences, 66 YALE. 
L.J. 204, 220 (1956) (arguing that the distinction between a penalty and a discount is “illusory . . . [and] 
that, whether by means of forfeiting a reward or incurring a penalty, a demand for trial will result in a 
more severe punishment than would be imposed following a guilty plea”); State v. Burgess, 943 A.2d 
727, 737 (N.H. 2008) (“Therefore, ‘[w]e doubt that a principled distinction may be drawn between 
“enhancing” the punishment imposed upon the [defendant] and denying him the “leniency” he claims 
would be appropriate if he had’ expressed remorse . . . .” (quoting Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 
552, 557 n.4 (1980))); Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (“[I]n reality there are 
winners and losers. The ‘normal’ sentence is the average sentence for all defendants, those who plead 
guilty and those who plead innocent. If we are ‘lenient’ toward the former, we are by precisely the same 
token ‘more severe’ toward the latter.”); Coles v. United States, 682 A.2d 167, 169 (D.C. 1996) (“The 
line between affording leniency to a defendant who has admitted guilt by pleading guilty and punishing 
one who has denied his guilt and proceeded to trial is elusive, to say the least.”). 
 6. Scholars in other fields have examined the concept of penalties and discounts extensively, but 
the subject has received far less extended analysis from criminal law scholars. For a few important 
exceptions, see Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three 
Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 98–103 (2001); Bowers, supra note 1, 1101–13; Langer, supra note 3, at 
229–47. 
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“plea discount” interchangeably, as though they were different 
phrases referring to the same idea. 7  Other times, they use “trial 
penalty” to refer to the difference between the sentence that a 
defendant would have received through trial or guilty plea.8 Other 
times, they say “trial penalty” to refer to the difference between the 
sentence of defendants who plead guilty and the average sentence of 
both defendants convicted at trial and those acquitted.9 Still other 
times, they may refer to the reduction in punishment included in plea 
offers to compensate defendants for giving up the chance of acquittal 
at trial. And still other times, they refer to a variety of prosecutorial 
tactics to manipulate the sentences of defendants who go to trial, 
including introducing extraneous evidence to “poison the court.”10 
Many of these legal phenomena are worthy of scholarly attention, but 
they are probably not all trial penalties. 
Another cause of the widespread scholarly disagreement on 
discounts and penalties is that the empirical literature is not 
dispositive. One problem is that the trial penalty is a subtle and 
abstract concept that can be difficult to test empirically. Another is 
that prosecutors are reluctant to talk openly and honestly about them. 
 
 7. See, e.g., Jeffery T. Ulmer & Mindy S. Bradley, Variation in Trial Penalties Among Serious 
Violent Offenses, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 631, 661 (2006) (noting that the authors “expected [a defendant’s] 
prior record to condition greater trial penalties” but finding little supporting evidence and explaining this 
unexpected result three sentences later by noting that prosecutors may “offer smaller plea discounts to 
those with extensive prior records”); Patricia D. Breen, The Trial Penalty and Jury Sentencing: A Study 
of Airforce Courts-Martial, 8 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 206, 231 (2011) (“Contrary to the rationale for a 
plea discount system, however, the vast majority of offenders (over 70 percent) pled guilty with either a 
judge or a jury without the threat of a trial penalty.”); Brian D. Johnson, Plea-Trial Differences in 
Federal Punishment: Research and Policy Implications, 31 FED. SENT’G REP. 256, 256 (2019) 
(“Although plea discounts are nothing new, the scope and magnitude of contemporary trial penalties are 
unprecedented.”). 
 8. E.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS., THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT 
TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW TO SAVE IT 11 (2018) [hereinafter NACDL]. 
 9. See, e.g., David S. Abrams, Is Pleading Really a Bargain?, 8 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 200, 201 
(2011) (reporting that defendants “have a lower expected sentence after a trial than after plea bargain” 
and noting in the next sentence that it is “widely believed that defendants who reject a plea bargain and 
insist on a trial face a ‘trial penalty’”). 
 10. E.g., Norman L. Reimer, NACDL to Expose the Trial Penalty in Bid to Resuscitate the Sixth 
Amendment, CHAMPION, Sept.–Oct. 2013, at 7, https://www.nacdl.org/Article/Sept-Oct2013-
NACDLtoExposetheTrialPenaltyin [https://perma.cc/7KTR-4WDP] (writing for the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers). 
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But again, perhaps the biggest problem is conceptual: we lack 
relevant data because scholars don’t know what to look for when 
searching for evidence of penalties and discounts in the real world. 
This Article seeks to bring greater theoretical and empirical clarity 
to the discount/penalty debate. To that end, in Part I, I offer a 
theoretical framework to define plea discounts and trial penalties. My 
hope is that by specifying their criteria, it will be easier to go out into 
the world and generate evidence about them. 
As others have observed, whether a plea offer represents a penalty 
or a discount depends on the normative baseline against which it’s 
measured.11 The tricky part is defining the normative baseline. To do 
so, I make two assumptions. The first is that the baseline is the 
sentence the defendant should receive.12 This assumption is modest, 
almost tautologically true. Indeed, with only a few exceptions,13 I 
place no restrictions on how one determines the sentence a defendant 
should receive. 
My second assumption is that the normative baseline does not take 
into account the defendant’s choice whether to exercise or waive the 
right to trial.14 A full defense of this assumption is beyond the scope 
of this Article,15 and a few readers will no doubt disagree. But, for 
 
 11. See, e.g., Langer, supra note 3, at 233–36; Bowers, supra note 1, at 1091–93. 
 12. There is at least one alternative way to define the baseline that conflicts with this first 
assumption. See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 1, at 1089. When applying the Due Process Clause to plea 
bargaining, the Supreme Court adopted a legalistic baseline, which permits prosecutors to threaten the 
maximum possible sentence supported by probable cause. Id. But, as I argue in greater detail below—
and as the vast majority of criminal law scholars appear to agree, see infra note 15, including those who 
have written full articles defending plea bargaining, see supra note 2—we should reject that alternative. 
See discussion infra Section II.B. 
 13. See infra Section I.B. 
 14. How might we do this? One possible model would be to imagine that the baseline is calculated 
through a mathematical formula with a list of inputs (for example, suffering caused, criminal history, 
remorse, etc.) and weights. If one input is whether the defendant exercised the right to trial, the weight 
for that input would be zero. Perhaps another model would be to imagine that the baseline is calculated 
under the assumption that the prosecutors office has infinite resources to fund trial litigation. 
 15. In this way, I do not grapple with the “baseline problem” or “baseline hell” discussed at length 
elsewhere. For a few key examples, see generally Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem 
of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984); Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989); Einer Elhauge, Contrived Threats Versus 
Uncontrived Warnings: A General Solution to the Puzzles of Contractual Duress, Unconstitutional 
Conditions, and Blackmail, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 503 (2016); Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, 
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several reasons, I suspect it captures most readers’ intuitions. First, 
unlike baseline questions in other contexts, which are unmoored from 
any constitutional anchors, the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution guarantees defendants the right to a jury trial. To be 
sure, that does not mean the government can never burden the 
exercise of the right to trial.16 But the existence of a constitutional 
right means it’s harder to justify increasing the baseline because a 
defendant insists on going to trial. Second, a large majority of 
criminal law scholars appear to agree that prosecutors shouldn’t seek 
higher punishments than a defendant should otherwise receive simply 
because the defendant exercises the right to trial.17 Many courts have 
 
and the Medicaid Expansion: A Study in the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 
1283 (2013); Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy: An Effects Theory of the Tax 
Power, 98 VA. L. REV. 1195 (2012). 
 16. The Supreme Court has rejected the application of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to 
plea bargaining. See Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
989, 1045–46 (2006) (“[I]n a departure from its unconstitutional conditions jurisprudence, the Court 
allows prosecutors to condition sentencing or charging deals on the waiver of constitutional trial 
rights.”); Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 801 (2003) (“The Court does 
not recognize the waiver of criminal protections through plea bargains to entail a form of the 
unconstitutional conditions problem . . . .”). 
 17. I have no systematic data to back up this claim, but it is based on personal conversations with 
many criminal law scholars over the last few years and on writings in scholarly literature. See, e.g., 
Berman, supra note 6, at 98–103; Langbein, supra note 3, at 213 (noting that plea bargaining is 
“coercive and unjust” because “the accused is threatened with an increased sanction for conviction after 
trial by comparison with that which is offered for confession and waiver”); Alschuler, supra note 3, at 
685 (“Defenders of plea negotiation typically treat post-trial sentences as the baseline from which plea 
agreements are to be judged.”); Church, supra note 4, at 520 (“[T]rial sentences must be objectively 
deserved according to whatever sentencing philosophy is embodied in the penal code. Plea bargaining 
should therefore result in sentences less than this theoretically correct sentence. Posttrial sentences that 
include a surcharge for refusal to plead guilty would very probably constitute the unconstitutional 
burden on the right to trial that, critics charge, inheres in all plea bargaining.”); Nemerson, supra note 4, 
at 698 (“[I]t is morally impermissible to impose a greater sentence on a defendant than that justified by 
his individual culpability for the purpose of coercing cooperation by the defendant or others, except in 
the most compelling cases of social need . . . .”); MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROC. 
§ 350.3(3)(c) (AM. L. INST. 1975) (“The prosecutor shall not seek to induce a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere by . . . threatening the defendant that if he pleads not guilty, his sentence may be more severe 
than that which is ordinarily imposed in the jurisdiction in similar cases on defendants who plead not 
guilty.”); STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST.: PLEAS OF GUILTY § 14-1.8(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 3d ed.1999) 
(“The court should not impose upon a defendant any sentence in excess of that which would be justified 
by any of the protective, deterrent, or other purposes of the criminal law because the defendant has 
chosen to require the prosecution to prove guilt at trial rather than to enter a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere.”). 
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supported this view as well in the sentencing context.18 For these 
reasons, I assume that the baseline does not change based on whether 
the defendant exercised or waived the right to trial. 
Based on these two assumptions, a plea offer represents a discount 
if the government says it will pursue at trial a sentence equal to or 
below the normative baseline, which is defined as the sentence the 
defendant should receive without accounting for the decision to 
exercise or waive the right to trial. Suppose, for example, that the 
government informs a defendant he can accept a guilty plea to 
charges that translate into a seven-year sentence or else the 
government will pursue charges at trial that translate into a ten-year 
sentence. If the normative baseline is ten years (or more), then the 
offer represents a discount because the government will pursue a 
punishment equal to (or less than) the baseline if the defendant goes 
to trial and will pursue an even lower punishment if the defendant 
waives the right to trial. In other words, the offer would merely 
expand the defendant’s range of choice by giving the option to plead 
guilty and receive a sentence that is lower than he should and would 
otherwise receive at trial. If, on the other hand, the baseline sentence 
is less than ten years, then the offer represents a penalty because the 
government threatens to pursue a sentence above the baseline if the 
defendant exercises the right to trial. Under these circumstances, the 
offer would be coercive because it would force the defendant to 
accept a harsher sentence than he should receive simply for 
exercising the constitutional right to trial. 
Next, in Part II, I apply these definitions of plea discounts and trial 
penalties to the existing evidence in the discount/penalty debate. One 
strong source of evidence is institutional theory: prosecutors clearly 
have the institutional capacity to inflict trial penalties, and they 
certainly have strong incentives to do so as well. Still, to adjudicate 
the discount/penalty debate, we would also benefit from empirical 
evidence about how prosecutors use penalties in the real world. 
 
 18. See infra note 58. 
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There are at least three sources of empirical evidence we can look 
to. The first are interview- and survey-based studies of the 
perceptions of prosecutors and defense attorneys. Their results are 
predictable: it depends on who you ask. Defense attorneys report that 
trial penalties are routine, while prosecutors uniformly deny them.19 
A second source of data comes from individual cases, which offer 
numerous, shocking examples of prosecutorial conduct that clearly 
inflicts a trial penalty.20 These anecdotes confirm that trial penalties 
happen more than they should, but it’s difficult to generalize how 
common or large such penalties are in the tens of millions of cases 
filed in criminal court each year.21 
Given the limits on surveys and anecdotes, we might hope to find 
more systematic empirical evidence in a third source, the statistical 
literature. The primary research design here compares sentences 
conditional on the stage of disposition—for example, comparing the 
sentences of defendants who plead guilty with those of defendants 
convicted at trial. Studies consistently find evidence of a plea-trial 
differential: defendants who plead guilty receive substantially lower 
sentences, on average, than defendants in similar cases convicted at 
trial.22 Some scholars have argued that this result is evidence of the 
trial penalty, but both discounts and penalties are consistent with a 
plea-trial differential; both theories predict that defendants who plead 
guilty receive lower sentences than if they are convicted at trial. 
Thus, on its own, the plea-trial differential cannot provide evidence 
of the trial penalty. It can only provide evidence of the trial penalty if 
we invoke the heavy assumption that the plea sentence is equal to (or 
above) the baseline sentence. Under those conditions, any trial 
sentence that exceeds the plea sentence would necessarily also 
exceed the baseline and would, therefore, constitute a trial penalty. I 
 
 19. See infra notes 68–72 and accompanying text. 
 20. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), is one of the most famous and shocking examples. 
 21. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., STATE COURT CASELOAD DIGEST: 2016 DATA 3 (2018), 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0029/23897/sccd_2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WU69-PPBE]. 
 22. See infra Section II.D. 
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suspect, however, that many readers would not accept the assumption 
that the plea sentence is equal to the baseline. 
How, then, might we construct an empirical test of trial penalties 
that does not rely on the heavy assumption that the plea sentence is 
equal to (or greater than) the baseline sentence? To do so, the 
discount and penalty theories need to make different predictions 
about prosecutorial behavior. As I have noted already, a third camp 
of criminal law scholars and jurists maintain that’s impossible, 
believing that discounts and penalties are merely two sides of the 
same coin. But that view, I suspect, is based on the assumption that 
the only way to study penalties and discounts is the way we always 
have—by comparing sentences conditional on the stage of 
disposition. 
In Part III, I argue that we can make more progress in our search 
for empirical evidence of trial penalties by looking elsewhere—not 
by comparing the sentence of a defendant conditional on the stage of 
disposition, but instead by holding fixed the stage of disposition and 
by comparing the sentence conditional on other factors that affect the 
size of the penalty or discount. In other words, we should compare 
the sentences of two defendants who either both plead guilty or who 
both go to trial but who do so under conditions in which other 
relevant factors vary. 
What factors might those be? The literature suggests that 
prosecutors have two key motivations to use discounts and penalties: 
conserving litigation costs and avoiding the risk of trial acquittal.23 
Litigation costs and acquittal risks change all the time, and when they 
do, the discount and penalty theories diverge from each other, 
predicting different prosecutorial behavior. 
Consider litigation costs. When prosecutors offer a discount to 
conserve resources, I argue, they decrease the sentence based on the 
level of resources the defendant saved the government by pleading 
 
 23. MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND 
DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 110–17 (1978) (reporting a qualitative study of prosecutors’ adaptation to plea 
bargaining). 
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guilty rather than forcing the government to obtain a conviction 
through trial. In contrast, when prosecutors threaten a penalty to 
conserve resources, they increase the sentence based on the level of 
resources the defendant forced the government to expend to secure 
the conviction. 
The distinction between these predictions is subtle, but it makes 
quite a difference—both theoretically and normatively. To see why, 
suppose that two defendants, D1 and D2, have cases against them 
that are identical in all respects except one: D1 is charged and 
convicted before the costs of trial litigation increase for the 
prosecution, while D2 is charged and convicted at some time 
afterwards. Under the penalty theory, if both defendants are 
convicted at trial, D2 should receive a longer sentence than D1 
because the prosecution is forced to expend more resources to 
convict D2. In contrast, under the discount theory, the defendants 
should receive the same sentence because they both save the 
prosecution no resources at all by demanding a trial. Thus, when 
litigation costs vary, the discount and penalty theories make different 
predictions about prosecutorial behavior. 
This is a notable theoretical result for a few reasons. First, it puts 
to bed the widespread view that discounts and penalties are two sides 
of the same coin. They can’t be if they make different predictions 
about prosecutorial behavior. 
Second, the theoretical result also offers a potential opportunity to 
test for discounts and penalties without relying on the heavy 
assumption, noted earlier, that the plea sentence is typically equal to 
(or higher than) the baseline sentence. Indeed, if prosecutors respond 
to rising litigation costs by decreasing plea sentences and leaving trial 
sentences unchanged, that provides meaningful evidence that their 
behavior is consistent with the plea discount theory. And, if they 
respond instead by leaving plea sentences unchanged and by 
increasing trial sentences, that’s consistent with the trial penalty 
theory. Moreover, the inference to trial penalties is even stronger 
with one comparatively light assumption—that the trial sentence 
before the hike in litigation costs was typically equal to (or higher 
12
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than) the normative baseline. If that assumption holds, then an 
increase in trial sentences after the hike in litigation costs would 
necessarily exceed the baseline and, in turn, represent especially 
strong evidence of a trial penalty. 
In Part IV, I assess whether and how we might incorporate these 
theoretical insights into an empirical study of discounts and penalties. 
I suggest that some policy changes in criminal courts—such as the 
adoption of open-file discovery—may provide suitable natural 
experiments to test my predictions. They may also help estimate both 
the prevalence and size of trial penalties and plea discounts enacted 
in response to the policy change. And, with sufficient sample sizes, 
they might also identify specific prosecutors offices that use penalties 
more aggressively than others. That said, there are several 
methodological challenges standing in the way of a robust empirical 
test. In addition to the usual problems in statistical work—like 
omitted variable bias, statistical power, and measurement error—we 
also need to worry about some other potential limitations, which I 
describe in greater detail below. 
I. WHAT ARE PLEA DISCOUNTS AND TRIAL PENALTIES? 
In this Part, I offer a theoretical definition of plea discounts and 
trial penalties. But before getting there, I need to lay out some 
background in Section A, where I describe the dominant theory of 
plea bargaining. I then turn to definitions in Section B. 
A. Background on Plea Bargaining 
Scholars have posited a number of reasons why prosecutors plea 
bargain, but two stand out.24 The first is organizational efficiency.25 
Prosecutors have limited resources in a world that they perceive 
 
 24. The classic empirical study is Milton Heumann’s Plea Bargaining: The Experiences of 
Prosecutors, Judges, and Defense Attorneys. HEUMANN, supra note 23, at 110–14. 
 25. GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 
40–61 (2003). 
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contains nearly unlimited crime. 26 Trials are an expensive way to 
secure convictions, and guilty pleas are much cheaper. Prosecutors 
thus prefer guilty pleas because they free up scarce resources to 
obtain convictions in more cases. 27  The second key reason why 
prosecutors plea bargain is risk aversion.28 A trial comes with the risk 
of acquittal, but a guilty plea assures conviction on at least one 
charge. 29  For both of these reasons, prosecutors have strong 
incentives to encourage guilty pleas through bargaining. 
Although scholars have raised reservations,30 the standard theory 
of plea bargaining, called the shadow-of-trial model, predicts when 
prosecutors and defendants settle and, if they do, what plea offer they 
agree to. 31  Under that model, both parties estimate the expected 
sentence at trial based on the probability of conviction and the likely 
sentence conditional on conviction. For example, if there’s an 80% 
chance that a defendant will be convicted and, if convicted, the court 
is likely to impose a sentence of ten years, then the expected sentence 
at trial is eight years (i.e., 10 years x 0.8). Assuming that the parties 
are rational and neutral time discounters, that they have access to the 
same information, and that they have similar stakes in the litigation, 
the theory predicts that they will form a plea agreement that will 
translate into an eight-year prison sentence. 
 
 26. See, e.g., Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (“[Prosecutors] must decide 
how best to allocate the scarce resources of a criminal justice system that simply cannot accommodate 
the litigation of every serious criminal charge.”). 
 27. See Rachel Barkow et al., How We Judge Prosecutors Has to Change, LAW.COM: N.Y.L.J. (Apr. 
9, 2019, 1:34 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/04/09/how-we-judge-prosecutors-
has-to-change/ (“Today, local prosecutors measure themselves by three core metrics: how many people 
are indicted on criminal charges, how many cases they try and how many convictions they secure (either 
through guilty pleas or convictions after trial). For too long, these metrics have been used to decide 
promotions and raises, and to confer professional capital, dictating who gets the best cases and whose 
work is celebrated.”). 
 28. HEUMANN, supra note 23, at 110–14. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2464, 2538 (2004) (mounting the leading critique of the shadow-of-trial model). 
 31. This theory of litigation has been discussed at length in both the civil and criminal litigation 
literatures. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The 
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 966–77 (1979) (inventing the shadow-of-trial model); George L. 
Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6–30 (1984); 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining As Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1969–74 (1992). 
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Of course, a number of facts about criminal litigation skew the 
shadow of trial, complicating the theory’s predictions. Perhaps most 
important for our purposes, the parties may have asymmetric 
litigation costs. In some cases, the social, financial, or psychological 
costs of litigation may be higher for defendants than the prosecution, 
especially if they are detained pretrial.32 In other cases, however, the 
costs may be higher for the prosecution, particularly given that most 
defendants do not pay for their legal representation.33 The side with 
relatively higher litigation costs is more likely to accept an 
unfavorable plea agreement relative to its estimate of the expected 
outcome of trial. 
As prior scholarship has observed, other features of the messy 
reality of criminal litigation can skew the trial’s shadow even 
further.34 The parties’ trial estimates are not always accurate due to 
information asymmetries about the evidence in the case and weak 
discovery rights. 35 The trial estimates may also be distorted by a 
range of cognitive biases, 36  such as overconfidence, 37  selective 
 
 32. See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1132–39 (2008). 
 33. See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SER. NO. NCJ 
179023, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000) (finding that defendants were represented by 
court-appointed counsel in 82% of felony cases in the top seventy-five largest counties). Still, 
defendants represented by public attorneys may experience significant agency problems due to 
oversized caseloads and misaligned bureaucratic incentives. See Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. 
Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense: Promoting Effective Representation Through Consumer 
Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice for All Criminal Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 77–95 
(1993). 
 34. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 30, at 2545. See generally William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and 
Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004). 
 35. Ben Grunwald, The Fragile Promise of Open-File Discovery, 49 CONN. L. REV. 771, 785–86 
(2017) (theorizing effects of information asymmetry on plea bargaining). 
 36. See Russell B. Korobkin, Psychological Impediments to Mediation Success: Theory and 
Practice, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 281, 284–94, 300, 303, 308–14 (2006) (reviewing the 
empirical evidence on cognitive biases and their implications for negotiations and mediation); Bibas, 
supra note 30, at 2498–502. 
 37. See, e.g., David Dunning et al., Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation: The Role of Idiosyncratic Trait 
Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Ability, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 324, 324 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (surveying high school students and 
finding that 69% reported believing they were in the top 10% in terms of their ability to get along with 
others and only 2% reported having below-average leadership skills); K. Patricia Cross, Not Can, but 
Will College Teaching Be Improved?, 17 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR HIGHER EDUC. 1, 10 (1977) (surveying 
college professors and finding that 94% believed they were above average at teaching); Marie 
Helweg-Larsen & James A. Shepperd, Do Moderators of the Optimistic Bias Affect Personal or Target 
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memory,38 and self-serving interpretation of evidence.39 And the fact 
of little public oversight in low-level cases may increase prosecutors’ 
incentives to dispose of those cases more quickly. 40  Still, the 
shadow-of-trial theory remains the dominant theoretical view of plea 
bargaining, and the few relevant empirical studies have largely 
supported it.41 
B. Defining Discounts and Penalties 
Defining plea discounts and trial penalties is a tricky task because 
these concepts are used in so many different ways. But, as others 
have observed, whether a plea offer represents a penalty or a discount 
 
Risk Estimates? A Review of the Literature, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. REV. 74, 74 (2001) 
(“Among the most robust findings in research on social perceptions and cognitions over the last two 
decades is the optimistic bias—the tendency for people to report that they are less likely than others to 
experience negative events and more likely than others to experience positive events.”). The 
overconfidence bias is particularly strong where—as in the plea bargaining context—individuals have 
some control over the outcome or the task is difficult. See Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd, supra, at 85–88; 
Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confidence, 24 
COGNITIVE PSYCH. 411, 425–28 (1992) (providing empirical evidence that overconfidence bias 
increases across tasks of varying mathematical difficulty). 
 38. George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 135, 150 (1993) (reporting that students randomly assigned to serve as plaintiffs or 
defendants recalled more arguments favoring their own positions). 
 39. See Leigh Thompson & George Loewenstein, Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness and 
Interpersonal Conflict, 51 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESS 176, 180–81 (1992) (reviewing the 
relevant empirical literature); Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 
J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 129, 130–32 (1954) (finding that after watching a football game, 
respondents who supported a particular football team reported observing fewer and less severe 
violations than respondents who supported the opposite team); Charles G. Lord et al., Biased 
Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered 
Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 2098, 2105–07 (1979) (finding that supporters and 
opponents of the death penalty interpret mixed evidence of its effectiveness as supporting their own 
position). 
 40. See Bowers, supra note 32, at 1122 (arguing that in low-level cases where there is “little public 
or official scrutiny,” prosecutors are “much more interested in reducing their own administrative costs” 
than in maximizing sentences). 
 41. One study assigned judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys to read case files that varied 
randomly on a range of case characteristics, including quality of inculpatory evidence and defendant 
characteristics. Shawn D. Bushway et al., An Explicit Test of Plea Bargaining in the “Shadow of the 
Trial,” 52 CRIMINOLOGY 723, 735–39 (2014). The subjects were then asked to estimate the probability 
of conviction, the expected sentence at trial, and the least favorable plea deal that they would be willing 
to accept. Id. at 731, 734. The prosecutors’ and defense attorneys’ answers were largely consistent with 
the shadow-of-trial theory. Id. at 740–47, 750. Though, the judges’ answers differed somewhat from 
theoretical expectation. Id. at 750. 
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depends on the normative baseline against which the offer is 
measured.42 
Returning to my earlier example, suppose the government informs 
a defendant he has two options: he can plead guilty to charges likely 
to result in a seven-year prison sentence, or he can go to trial where 
the government will pursue charges that would result in a ten-year 
sentence in the event of a conviction. The offer represents a discount 
if the normative baseline is ten years (or more) because the 
government will pursue a punishment at trial equal to (or less than) 
the baseline. The offer represents a penalty if the baseline sentence is 
less than ten years because going to trial will increase the defendant’s 
sentence above that baseline. 
Discounts and penalties have different normative implications for 
the practice of plea bargaining. In the case of discounts, the plea offer 
merely expands the set of choices available to the defendant: he can 
go to trial and receive the sentence he should receive based on the 
judgment of a jury and sentencing judge, or he can waive his right to 
trial and receive a lower sentence.43 We usually don’t think that an 
offer is coercive if it merely expands an individual’s choice set. 
Suppose, for example, that a homeowner is offered three times the 
market price for their house. That offer might be difficult to turn 
down, but we wouldn’t say it is therefore coercive. The same is true 
in the case of plea bargaining. A prosecutor might believe that a 
defendant deserves nine years of prison time but is willing to 
discount the sentence down to three to avoid the costs of trial. If so, 
the offer might be too good to turn down, but it is not coercive for 
that reason alone. 
A trial penalty, however, takes on a more coercive shape. 
According to one “frequent” definition in the philosophical and legal 
literature, an offer is coercive if “it would be wrong to carry out the 
act threatened.” 44  If it is wrong for the government to pursue a 
 
 42. Langer, supra note 3, at 233–36; Bowers, supra note 1. 
 43. See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 
1963–66 (1992). 
 44. Berman, supra note 6, at 15. 
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punishment above the baseline, then it is coercive to threaten a 
penalty. When threatening a penalty, the prosecutor’s offer does not 
merely expand the range of choices available to the defendant. 
Presumably, if the parties were forbidden from plea bargaining and 
the government thus could not make a plea offer, it would drop any 
charges above the baseline because it would have no reason to pursue 
them. 45  If so, the use of plea bargaining to inflict trial penalties 
artificially constrains defendants’ range of choice and thus coerces 
defendants into pleading guilty to a sentence they otherwise might 
not accept. As noted, this is plea bargaining’s biggest problem. Even 
those scholars who have written full articles defending plea 
bargaining have recognized the need to assume the possibility of 
penalties away.46 
The next question is: how do we define the normative baseline? 
Many factors might go into calculating the baseline in any particular 
case: criminal charges, evidence, mental culpability, harms to 
victims, criminal history, personal history, family relations, and local 
conditions such as crime rates and prosecutorial resources. 
Fortunately, for purposes of this Article, we don’t need to draw any 
 
 45. See id. at 103. 
 46. See Church, supra note 4 (noting that one of the “theoretical assumptions” of the article’s 
“defense” of plea bargaining is that “cases that go to trial must be decided on the merits, without 
penalizing the defendant for not pleading guilty”); Michael Young, In Defense of Plea-Bargaining’s 
Possible Morality, 40 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 251, 253, 268–69 (2013) (stating that the paper’s defense only 
applies where prosecutors do not threaten a trial penalty); Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Should We Really 
“Ban” Plea Bargaining: The Core Concerns of Plea Bargaining Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 770 
(1998) (“[I]f the sentence imposed at a trial is the appropriate sentence for the defendant’s crime, then 
plea bargaining allows criminals to escape with less than appropriate sentences.” (emphasis added)); 
Howe, supra note 4 (arguing that plea bargaining critics have failed to provide evidence that prosecutors 
do in fact threaten penalties). In one notable article, described by Judge Easterbrook as the “best 
defense” of plea bargaining, Easterbrook, supra note 31, Robert Scott and William Stuntz argue that 
trial penalties are a “troubling” practice. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 43, at 1963. Judge Easterbrook, also 
a defender of plea bargaining, appeared to concur, writing that he “agree[d] on everything Scott and 
Stuntz themselves view as novel about their article.” Easterbrook, supra note 31. Over a decade later, 
Stuntz revisited the issue with greater concern: “Plea bargains will be fair and just if, but only if, the 
threats that induce them are fair and just. . . . [T]here is no reason to believe that those threats are fair—
indeed, there is good reason to believe the opposite.” William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: The 
Rise of Plea Bargaining and the Decline of the Rule of Law 24 (Harvard Pub. L. Working Paper No. 
120, 2005), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=854284 [https://perma.cc/2Y4P-
C2AE]. 
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firm conclusions about how to calculate the baseline in individual 
cases. As long as we assume that a baseline does exist, an assumption 
necessarily implied by the very concepts of plea discounts and 
penalties, we can make substantial conceptual progress. 
In defining the normative baseline, I make two general 
assumptions. The first is that the baseline is the sentence the 
defendant should receive. This assumption is modest, almost 
tautological. Indeed, with only one exception noted below, I place no 
restrictions on how one determines the sentence a defendant should 
receive. Retributivists and utilitarians alike are free to define it 
however they want. 
Still, this first assumption is inconsistent with at least one 
alternative definition of plea bargaining’s baseline: in Bordenkircher 
v. Hayes, the Supreme Court rejected that assumption for purposes of 
evaluating whether a plea offer violates the Due Process Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution.47 In its stead, the Court adopted a legalistic 
baseline, “defined by what the prosecutor is lawfully allowed to 
do.” 48  Under this baseline, prosecutors can threaten the highest 
possible trial sentence—without running afoul of the Due Process 
Clause—as long as the charges are supported by probable cause.49 
Bordenkircher probably offers the wrong baseline to evaluate the 
normative status of a plea offer. For one thing, the Due Process 
Clause imposes a constitutional minimum, designed to prohibit only 
the worst forms of government behavior.50 The fact that a plea offer 
doesn’t violate the Due Process Clause doesn’t mean that we 
shouldn’t be deeply morally concerned about it. More important, in 
the almost unanimous view of criminal law scholars, Bordenkircher 
was wrongly decided.51 As others have noted, prosecutors have an 
 
 47. 434 U.S. 357, 363–64 (1978). 
 48. Bowers, supra note 1, at 1089; see also Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364. 
 49. Bowers, supra note 1, at 1089. 
 50. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, A Floor, Not a Ceiling: Federalism and Remedies for Violations of 
Constitutional Rights in Danforth v. Minnesota, 102 NW. L. REV. COLLOQUY 365, 365 (2008) (“Few 
doubt that states can provide greater protection for individual rights under state constitutions than is 
available under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Federal Constitution.”). 
 51. For a small sampling of the papers attacking Bordenkircher, see Stuntz, supra note 46 (“Plea 
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incentive to “threaten charges that are excessive, even by [their] own 
lights.”52 Bordenkircher’s baseline permits this strategy. The result is 
that defendants who are threatened may accept plea offers they 
wouldn’t otherwise accept. And, “once the threat [is] made, it ha[s] to 
be carried out” because a “prosecutor who becomes known as a 
pushover will be taken advantage of.”53 Thus, the defendant who is 
threatened with a severe penalty and nonetheless chooses to go to 
trial risks receiving a sentence far higher than he should receive. 
My second assumption is that the normative baseline does not take 
into account whether the defendant goes to trial.54 I do not offer a 
complete defense of this assumption here—doing so might require 
grappling with the notoriously difficult “baseline problem”55—but I 
suspect this assumption captures most readers’ intuitions for a few 
reasons. First, the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
 
bargains will be fair and just if, but only if, the threats that induce them are fair and just. Given the rule 
established by the Court in Bordenkircher, there is no reason to believe that those threats are fair—
indeed, there is good reason to believe the opposite.”); Bowers, supra note 1, at 1126 (describing 
Bordenkircher’s reasoning as “positively feeble”); Berman, supra note 6, at 103 (calling Bordenkircher 
the “near-wholesale abdication of the judicial responsibility to protect Sixth Amendment rights from 
state coercion”); Timothy Lynch, The Case Against Plea Bargaining, 26 REGULATION 24, 27 (2003) 
(arguing that Bordenkircher “unleashed a runaway train”); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and 
the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 879 (2009) 
(describing the prosecutorial strategy in Bordenkircher as “coercive” and noting that the decision gave 
“prosecutors the ability to exact a heavy price on defendants who opt to take a case to trial to get them to 
plead guilty to the charge the prosecutor believes is the appropriate one”); Darryl K. Brown, Lafler, Frye 
and Our Still-Unregulated Plea Bargaining System, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 131, 132 (2012) (arguing that, 
under Bordenkircher, “prosecutors are free to pose the choice to a defendant of a five-year sentence for 
a guilty plea or life without parole after conviction at trial, even if evidence . . . makes clear that the 
lesser sentence is the ordinary one and the latter one unprecedented”); Andrew Manuel Crespo, The 
Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1303, 1311 (2018) (describing the plea 
bargaining system sanctioned by Bordenkircher as “fundamentally coercive”); Stephanos Bibas, 
Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 971 (2009) 
(describing the prosecutorial practices upheld in Bordenkircher as “coercive”); Albert W. Alschuler, The 
Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 652, 656 n.8 (1981) (asserting that “a system that 
permitted and condoned even an occasional Bordenkircher would seem to bear a significant burden of 
justification”); Clark Neily, America’s Criminal Justice System Is Rotten to the Core, CATO INST. (June 
7, 2020), https://www.cato.org/blog/americas-criminal-justice-system-rotten-core 
[https://perma.cc/VPK9-UNSQ] (noting that the Bordenkircher Court “rejected a due process challenge 
to a prosecutor’s nakedly coercive threat to increase a defendant’s exposure . . . to life imprisonment”). 
 52. Barkow, supra note 51, at 879 (quoting Stuntz, supra note 46, at 26). 
 53. Stuntz, supra note 46, at 4, 24. 
 54. For an explanation of how we might do this, see supra note 14. 
 55. See sources cited supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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guarantees criminal defendants the right to a jury trial. Of course, that 
doesn’t prohibit all possible burdens on the right.56 But the existence 
of a constitutional right means it’s harder to justify increasing the 
baseline because a defendant elects to go to trial. Second, a large 
majority of criminal law scholars appear to agree that prosecutors 
shouldn’t seek higher punishments than a defendant should otherwise 
receive simply for exercising the right to trial.57 Many courts have 
supported this view as well in the sentencing context.58 For these 
reasons, I assume that the baseline does not change depending on 
whether the defendant exercised or waived the right to trial. 
Based on these two assumptions, a plea offer represents a trial 
penalty if the government threatens to pursue charges at trial above 
the normative baseline, which is defined as the punishment the 
defendant should receive without incorporating his decision to 
exercise or waive the right to trial. In contrast, a plea offer represents 
a discount if it is below the baseline, and the government says it will 
pursue a punishment at trial that is equal to or below the normative 
baseline. 
II. EXISTING EVIDENCE OF DISCOUNTS AND PENALTIES 
Having defined plea discounts and trial penalties, I next apply 
them to assess which one is borne out by the publicly available 
evidence. There are at least four sources we can look to. 
 
 56. Notably, the Supreme Court has rejected the application of the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions to plea bargaining. See sources cited supra note 16. 
 57. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 17. 
 58. Judge Wald of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, for example, explained: 
A sentencing judge . . . could not say, “I would have given you five years if you 
didn’t go to trial, but since you did, I will give you seven,” but he could say, 
“Although I might otherwise have given you seven years, I am giving you only five 
years because you are remorseful, as shown, in part, by your willingness to plead 
guilty.” In the first case, the judge has arrived at a benchmark sentence he believes 
just in all respects, but then added an extra increment because the defendant has 
burdened the system by going to trial. In the second case, the judge is according a 
measure of leniency by viewing the guilty plea as evidence of acceptance of 
responsibility and, as such, worthy of consideration. 
United States v. Jones, 997 F.2d 1475, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
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A. Institutional Theory 
The first source of evidence is institutional theory—that is, what 
we know about the background institutional structures that govern 
the criminal process. As several papers have described in vivid 
detail, 59 there are strong grounds to believe that prosecutors have 
both the institutional capacity and incentives to inflict trial 
penalties. 60 To oversimplify, the capacity stems from prosecutors’ 
wide discretion both in charging and plea bargaining. In charging, 
prosecutors wield nearly unreviewable discretion; the courts cannot 
review a decision not to charge, and it’s incredibly difficult for them 
to overturn a decision to charge as long as the indictment is supported 
by probable cause, a low evidentiary standard.61 When deciding what 
charges to file, prosecutors also have a long statutory menu of 
overlapping crimes that enables both horizontal and vertical 
overcharging. 62 With respect to plea bargaining, prosecutors’ plea 
deals are rarely reviewed or overturned by the courts, and stingy 
discovery policies in some jurisdictions mean that defendants may be 
forced to negotiate in the dark.63 As a result, a prosecutor has the 
institutional capacity to overcharge—that is, file charges that are 
technically legal because they are supported by probable cause but 
 
 59. See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 2, at 23–26; NACDL, supra note 8, at 6. 
 60. These institutional capacities and incentives have likely grown over the last few decades. See 
Note, Breathing New Life into Prosecutorial Vindictiveness Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2074, 2087–
94 (2001) (cataloging changes in the criminal justice system that might encourage greater prosecutorial 
vindictiveness). 
 61. See Peter Krug, Prosecutorial Discretion and Its Limits, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 643, 646–48, 651 
n.50 (2002) (summarizing the reviewability of prosecutors’ decisions to charge or not charge); see also 
Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“Few subjects are less adapted to judicial 
review than the exercise by the Executive of his discretion in deciding when and whether to institute 
criminal proceedings . . . .”). 
 62. Allison O. Larsen, Bargaining Inside the Black Box, 99 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1601 (2011) (“Trial 
taxes are aggravated by overcriminalization and overcharging because the prosecutor does not act as the 
safety valve the legislature counts on him to be.”); see also Clark Neily, Prisons Are Packed Because 
Prosecutors Are Coercing Plea Deals. And, Yes, It’s Totally Legal, NBC NEWS: THINK (Aug. 8, 2019, 
7:33 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/prisons-are-packed-because-prosecutors-are-
coercing-plea-deals-yes-ncna1034201 [https://perma.cc/TLZ2-QJJD] (“American prosecutors are 
equipped with a fearsome array of tools they can use to extract confessions and discourage people from 
exercising their right to a jury trial. These tools include charge-stacking (charging more or more serious 
crimes than the conduct really merits) [and] legislatively-ordered mandatory-minimum sentences . . . .”). 
 63. Larsen, supra note 62, at 1571. 
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for which the defendant shouldn’t be punished—and then use those 
extra charges as bargaining chips to encourage a guilty plea.64 This is 
quite clearly a trial penalty. 
In addition to having the capacity to inflict trial penalties, 
prosecutors also have strong incentives to do so. As noted already, 
prosecutors seek guilty pleas to conserve resources, reduce workload, 
pursue convictions against a greater number of guilty offenders, and 
eliminate the chance of acquittal.65 The threat of a trial penalty would 
help a prosecutor secure more guilty pleas. 
Still, there are some modest countervailing pressures. Prosecutors 
concerned about their own reputations might not want others to 
perceive that they inflict trial penalties. Ethical commitments to 
professionalism and justice, as well as professional norms, might also 
discourage some prosecutors. 66  And, as Andrew Crespo argues, 
subconstitutional criminal rules might impose at least some 
meaningful checks on prosecutorial penalty strategies in at least some 
cases.67 On balance, however, the institutional incentives lean heavily 
towards trial penalties rather than against them. 
B. Interviews 
The second source of evidence comes from qualitative interviews 
and survey data of prosecutors’ and defense attorneys’ perceptions of 
the use of trial penalties and plea discounts. The results of these 
studies are, perhaps, predictable: it depends on who you ask. For 
 
 64. Bowers, supra note 1, at 1089. 
 65. See supra Section I.A. 
 66. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROC. § 350.3(3)(c) (AM. L. INST. 1975) (“The 
prosecutor shall not seek to induce a plea of guilty or nolo contendere by . . . threatening the defendant 
that if he pleads not guilty, his sentence may be more severe than that which is ordinarily imposed in the 
jurisdiction in similar cases on defendants who plead not guilty.”); STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST.: PLEAS 
OF GUILTY § 14-1.8(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 3d ed.1999) (“The court should not impose upon a defendant 
any sentence in excess of that which would be justified by any of the protective, deterrent, or other 
purposes of the criminal law because the defendant has chosen to require the prosecution to prove guilt 
at trial rather than to enter a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.”). 
 67. Crespo, supra note 51, at 1316–56 (arguing that an array of subconstitutional procedural rules, 
including joinder, severance, preclusion, concurrent sentencing, pretrial evidentiary review, summary 
dismissals, and bills of particulars, impose some regulatory constraints on a prosecutor’s ability to 
overcharge and then bargain down). 
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example, a pioneering study based on interviews with prosecutors in 
the 1960s by Albert Alschuler reports that “[d]efense attorneys in 
almost every jurisdiction claim that prosecutors ‘overcharge.’” 68 
Alschuler supports this assertion with powerful anecdotes from 
defense attorneys about how prosecutors overcharge and then bargain 
down in exchange for a guilty plea.69 But Alschuler also finds that 
prosecutors “in almost every jurisdiction deny that their initial 
charges are inflated” and provide alternative explanations for 
prosecutorial practices perceived as overcharging.70 He reports very 
few anecdotes from prosecutors that support the trial penalty 
theory.71 And the prosecutors surveyed also claimed that the kinds of 
bargains the defense attorneys complained about almost never affect 
the ultimate sentence the defendant receives.72 
Another classic qualitative study of plea bargaining, conducted by 
Milton Heumann in 1978, also provides only limited anecdotal 
evidence of trial penalties (as I have defined them).73 In a few quotes, 
prosecutors admit that they “penalize” defendants who go to trial, or 
 
 68. Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 85–105 
(1968) [hereinafter Alschuler, Prosecutor’s Role]; see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role 
in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1090 n.96 (1976) [hereinafter Alschuler, Trial 
Judge’s Role] (noting that the Chicago Sun-Times quoted several defense attorneys saying that judges in 
Chicago tell defendants that they will impose significantly higher sentences). 
 69. Alschuler, Prosecutor’s Role, supra note 68. Perhaps the most famous related anecdote concerns 
the behavior of a judge, not a prosecutor. See Alschuler, Trial Judge’s Role, supra note 68, at 1089. One 
defense attorney reported to Alschuler that a Chicago judge once told him: “If your client goes to trial 
and is convicted, the minimum term will not be just the ten years required by the [mandatory minimum] 
statute. The minimum term will be twenty years in the penitentiary.” Id. The judge further explained: 
“He takes some of my time—I take some of his. That’s the way it works.” Id. 
 70. Alschuler, Prosecutor’s Role, supra note 68, at 85. 
 71. One exception comes from a San Francisco prosecutor who said his office “may charge theft, 
burglary, and the possession of burglar’s tools, because we know that if we charged only burglary there 
would be a trial.” Id. at 90. For another powerful admission from a prosecutor, see Breathing New Life 
into Prosecutorial Vindictiveness Doctrine, supra note 60, at 2081 n.60 (“Sometimes a public defender 
or a defense lawyer will just try and bust your ass all the time. Frankly, you end up busting theirs back. 
You get irritated, but you try not to take it out on the people they represent. The defendant didn’t know 
this asshole lawyer he hired from Adam’s housecat. Maybe the state just appointed this son of a bitch to 
represent him. Should you penalize him for that? No. Do we? Probably, sometimes. You try not to, but 
we’re human.” (quoting MARK BAKER, PROSECUTORS IN THEIR OWN WORDS 79–80 (1999))). 
 72. Alschuler, Prosecutor’s Role, supra note 68, at 85. 
 73. HEUMANN, supra note 23. 
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at least those who do so frivolously.74 But because the questions the 
prosecutors are answering don’t distinguish between trial penalties 
and discounts, it’s not clear what they mean. They may very well be 
referring to discounts and not penalties. For example, one prosecutor 
was asked, “if the case goes to trial, are you looking for a[] higher 
penalty than you were willing to bargain for in advance?” 75  An 
answer in the affirmative would be equally consistent with both the 
discount theory and the penalty theory. 76 It’s unclear whether the 
question was phrased differently to other prosecutors, but it probably 
was not. Other related passages in the book similarly do not 
distinguish between discounts and penalties (again, as I have defined 
them).77 
What exactly can we take away from interview- and survey-based 
studies? It’s hard to say. For one thing, much of the evidence comes 
from defense attorneys who may sometimes misperceive 
prosecutorial tactics. On the other hand, prosecutors have strong 
incentives to stay quiet about trial penalties. Perhaps the best we can 
say is that the interviews and surveys suggest trial penalties do in fact 
happen. 
C. Cases 
The third source of evidence comes from individual cases in which 
the prosecutor’s behavior suggests a trial penalty. One of the clearest 
and most famous is Bordenkircher v. Hayes, in which a defendant 
was charged with writing a fraudulent check for $88, which carried a 
sentence of two to ten years.78 The prosecutor informed the defendant 
 
 74. Id. at 124 (“I think human nature being what it is, sure, some people get penalized for motions 
and trials. Why not? You’re dealing with human beings. . . . Sure, judges will penalize [a defense 
attorney for frivolous motions] and so will prosecutors.”). 
 75. Id. at 125. 
 76. See, e.g., id. at 66 (“[T]here is a penalty attached to going to trial and losing; conversely, there is 
a reward accorded the defendant who forsakes his right to trial and pleads guilty.”); see also id. at 140 
(“If, on the other hand, the issue is perceived as frivolous, the judge feels that the reward for plea 
bargaining ought to be denied—or, put differently—that a penalty for these motions and trial ought to be 
extracted.”). 
 77. See, e.g., id. at 141. 
 78. 434 U.S. 357, 358 (1978). 
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that, if he would plead guilty, the prosecutor would recommend a 
five-year sentence in court. 79 The prosecutor also said that, if the 
defendant went to trial, the prosecutor would supplement the 
indictment with a career-offender enhancement that would impose a 
mandatory life sentence—a charge that would be legal because the 
defendant had two prior convictions. 80 The defendant rejected the 
offer and, as promised, the prosecutor added the habitual-offender 
charge. 81  When convicted at trial, the defendant received a life 
sentence for trying to steal $88.82 
The evidence of a trial penalty is strong here. 83 At the very 
beginning, the government reasonably decided not to file the 
habitual-offender charge, presumably because a fraudulent $88 check 
couldn’t possibly merit a life sentence.84 Afterward, the prosecutor 
did not appear to receive any new information about the case before 
filing the enhancement charge; indeed, the only predicate facts for 
the enhancement were prior convictions in the defendant’s criminal 
history—information that was likely available at the time of 
charging.85 Moreover, the prosecutor stated in open court his reason 
for adding the enhancement, asking the defendant on 
cross-examination: 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 358–59. One prior conviction was for robbery. Id. at 359 n.3. For the other, the defendant 
was charged with rape but ultimately convicted of “detaining a female.” Id. He received no prison time 
for either offense. Id. at 370 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 81. Id. at 359. 
 82. Id. 
 83. The Supreme Court, for its part, disagreed. See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 378–80 
(1982). Four years after Bordenkircher, Justice Stevens explained the Court’s reasoning in that case as 
follows: 
In declining to apply a presumption of vindictiveness, the Court recognized that 
“additional” charges obtained by a prosecutor could not necessarily be characterized 
as an impermissible “penalty.” Since charges brought in an original indictment may 
be abandoned by the prosecutor in the course of plea negotiation—in often what is 
clearly a “benefit” to the defendant—changes in the charging decision that occur in 
the context of plea negotiation are an inaccurate measure of improper prosecutorial 
“vindictiveness.” 
Id. 
 84. See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 370 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 85. See id. at 358–59 (majority opinion). 
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Isn’t it a fact that I told you at [our initial bargaining session] if 
you did not intend to plead guilty to five years for this charge 
and . . . save the court the inconvenience and necessity of a 
trial . . . that I intended to return to the grand jury and ask them 
to indict you based upon these prior felony convictions?86 
Clearly, the prosecutor inflicted a trial penalty. 
There are many other documented cases of trial penalties, too.87 In 
2018, for example, the National Academy of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers (NACDL) published a paper examining “the structures and 
mechanisms in the federal system that perpetuate the trial penalty.”88 
Most relevant for our purposes, the report described five federal 
cases that, in my view, provide evidence that the prosecution sought 
to inflict a trial penalty.89 Other published papers provide many more 
disturbing examples.90 
Cases like Bordenkircher and those documented in the NACDL 
report and elsewhere are deeply concerning because they confirm 
that prosecutors do inflict trial penalties. But it’s hard to infer from 
individual cases—even a large number—the prevalence and 
magnitude of trial penalties in the tens of millions of cases filed in 
criminal court each year.91 
 
 86. Id. at 358 n.1. 
 87. See, e.g., Twiggs v. Superior Court, 667 P.2d 1165, 1167 (Cal. 1983) (en banc) (noting that the 
prosecutor amended the information, adding five prior felony convictions, two days after the defendant 
refused to accept a plea offer, even though the prosecutor was aware of those convictions from the 
beginning); State v. Halling, 672 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (The prosecutor said to the 
defense attorney, “I have a brilliant idea. I have just thought of a way to cause further evil to poor Mr. 
Halling” and then explained that she “intended to charge defendant with additional crimes unless he 
accepted her previous offer.”). 
 88. NACDL, supra note 8, at 7. 
 89. Id. at 31, 37, 43, 50, 53. The report also describes the cases of four other individual defendants, 
but, in my view, the evidence of a penalty is unclear because other case factors—often departures for 
substantial assistance to the government—could explain the claimed plea-trial differential. Id. at 29, 41, 
46, 57. Reasonable minds could certainly disagree, and so I encourage interested readers to consult the 
report. 
 90. See, e.g., Janeanne Murray, Ameliorating the Federal Trial Penalty Through a Systematic 
Judicial “Second Look” Procedure, 31 FED. SENT’G REP. 279, 280 (2019). 
 91. See COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, STATE CT. CASELOAD DIG. 13 (2018) (reporting statistics on 
the national criminal caseload over time). 
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D. Statistical Studies 
The fourth source of evidence often discussed in the 
discount/penalty debate is the quantitative empirical literature on the 
plea-trial differential: the difference in sentences that defendants 
receive if they plead guilty or go to trial. All of the studies in this 
literature have explored this question by fitting a multivariate 
regression model on one of three dependent variables—whether the 
judge imposed any prison time, the length of any prison sentence, or 
whether the judge granted a guideline departure. 92  They then 
compare these outcome variables across cases conditional on the 
stage of disposition—that is, for example, comparing the sentence 
that would be imposed after a guilty plea with the sentence after a 
trial conviction, holding fixed all other observable characteristics like 
charges, criminal history, and demographics.93 
The estimates produced by these studies vary widely. A few have 
found no difference between the sentences imposed in cases resolved 
by guilty plea and cases resolved by trial,94 but most have found a 
difference, frequently substantial in size, and in some cases up to 
75%. 95  According to a recent review of the empirical literature, 
 
 92. See infra notes 94–96. 
 93. See infra notes 94–95. 
 94. William M. Rhodes, Plea Bargaining: Its Effect on Sentencing and Convictions in the District of 
Columbia, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 360, 367 (1979) (finding no evidence of a plea-trial 
differential in three of the four categories of cases examined from the District of Columbia courts); 
Douglas A. Smith, The Plea Bargaining Controversy, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 949, 965 (1986) 
(finding that “serious offenders who plead[ed] guilty receive[d] prison sentences similar to the expected 
outcome if they had gone to trial” in 2,000 robbery and burglary cases in American cities in 1978); Gary 
D. LaFree, Adversarial and Nonadversarial Justice: A Comparison of Guilty Pleas and Trials, 23 
CRIMINOLOGY 289, 307 (1985) (finding that “when acquittals are included in the analysis, defendants 
who went to trial did not receive more severe penalties than those who pled guilty” in a sample of 3,000 
robbery and burglary cases in six jurisdictions from 1976 to 1977); Abrams, supra note 9, at 208, 218 
(finding that, in a sample of 42,000 cases filed between 1997 and 2001 in Cook County, Illinois, 
defendants who pled guilty received less severe sentences than defendants who went to trial). 
 95. Thomas M. Uhlman & N. Darlene Walker, “He Takes Some of My Time; I Take Some of His”: 
An Analysis of Judicial Sentencing Patterns in Jury Cases, 14 L. & SOC’Y REV. 323, 333 tbl.2 (1980) 
(finding that, in a sample of 30,000 cases in one city between 1968 and 1974, sentences were 48%–66% 
shorter in cases resolved by guilty plea than in cases resolved by trial); David Brereton & Jonathan D. 
Casper, Does It Pay to Plead Guilty? Differential Sentencing and the Functioning of Criminal Courts, 
16 L. & SOC’Y REV. 45, 61 (1981) (finding evidence of a “substantial sentence differential” in 7,000 
robbery and burglary cases from 1974 to 1978); Ulmer & Bradley, supra note 7, at 631, 643, 650 
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studies have “typically” found a 13%–40% average reduction in 
sentence length for defendants who plead guilty relative to those 
convicted at trial.96 
One might argue that this finding is evidence of a trial penalty, but 
the plea-trial differential fits just as well with the discount theory as it 
does with the penalty theory. Both theories predict that defendants 
who plead guilty receive lower sentences than defendants convicted 
at trial. 
The plea-trial differential can only provide evidence of trial 
penalties if we assume that the plea sentence is equal to (or greater 
than) the baseline sentence. Under those conditions, any trial 
sentence that exceeds the plea sentence would necessarily also 
exceed the baseline and would, therefore, constitute a trial penalty. 
There are reasons to support the assumption that the plea sentence 
is equal to (or greater than) the baseline sentence. First, as in 
Bordenkircher, in some cases the plea-trial differential might be so 
large that no reasonable prosecutor would be willing to grant such a 
discount for the sake of organizational efficiency.97 If so, it may be 
reasonable to infer that the plea sentence is equal to or closer to the 
baseline than the trial sentence. As noted earlier, a few studies have 
 
(finding that “jury trial conviction ha[d] roughly 2.7 times the incarceration odds of a guilty plea” in a 
sample of 8,500 cases from Pennsylvania from 1997 to 2001); Anthony Walsh, Standing Trial Versus 
Copping a Plea: Is There a Penalty?, 6 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 226, 229 (1990) (finding that “trial 
defendants received 13.55 months imprisonment more than plea defendants after adjusting for other 
relevant variables” in a sample of 600 felony cases from a metropolitan city in Ohio from 1978 to 1983); 
Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences After Guilty Plea, 
Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 968 (2005) (finding 
consistent evidence from five different states that defendants who plead guilty receive shorter sentences 
than defendants who receive a jury trial); Jeffery T. Ulmer et al., Trial Penalties in Federal Sentencing: 
Extra-Guidelines Factors and District Variation, 27 JUST. Q. 560, 575 (2010) (finding that “trial 
sentences are 16% greater than for guilty pleas” in federal courts from 2000 to 2002). 
 96. See Brian D. Johnson, Trials and Tribulations: The Trial Tax and the Process of Punishment, 48 
CRIME & JUST. 313, 313 (2019). As the article notes, the plea-trial differential can be calculated either as 
the proportional reduction in sentence for defendants who plead guilty relative to those who go to trial 
or as the proportional increase in sentence for defendants who go to trial relative to those who plead 
guilty. Id. at 323. The article reports the results using the former: “Estimates of [the plea-trial 
differential] . . . typically involve[] . . . a 15–60 percent increase in average sentence length.” Id. at 313. 
These statistics are equivalent to a 13%–40% decrease in the average sentence length for plea sentences 
relative to trial sentences. 
 97. See discussion supra Section II.C. 
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found very large average plea-trial differentials—sometimes up to 
76%.98 But, again, the weight of the evidence suggests a differential 
that is substantially smaller, closer to 13%–40%.99 
Second, some scholars have argued that the normative baseline in 
most cases must be the plea sentence because the vast majority of 
cases—around 95%—are resolved by guilty plea.100 This argument 
has obvious persuasive force, but the government has a powerful 
response: it might reasonably prefer to convict and punish a larger 
number of defendants even if that means giving them substantially 
less punishment than they should receive.101 The government might, 
for example, prefer to give convicted defendants 50% less 
punishment than they should receive if doing so enables the 
government to convict 25% more defendants. That tradeoff may be 
optimal under both a retributive theory of punishment that focuses on 
desert and a utilitarian theory that focuses on deterrence. For these 
reasons, it’s difficult to conclude, based on the high plea rate alone, 
that the normative baseline in most cases is the plea sentence. 
Third, one might infer from the absolute severity of American 
criminal punishment that trial sentences are far higher than the 
normative baseline. This argument is particularly compelling for 
low-level drug and property crimes, where incarceration is arguably 
 
 98. See, e.g., Uhlman & Walker, supra note 95, at 332. 
 99. Johnson, supra note 96. Interestingly, the United Kingdom has a statute that requires judges to 
“take into account . . . the stage in the proceedings for the offence at which the offender indicated his 
intention to plead guilty.” ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 141–48 (3d ed. 
2000). Similar to the 40% estimate from the literature, the Court of Appeals has recommended that that 
“something of the order of one-third would very often be an appropriate discount from the sentence 
which would otherwise be imposed in a contested trial.” R v. Buffery (1993) 14 Cr. App. R(S) 511 at 
515. 
 100. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 3, at 1138 (“The expected post-trial sentence is . . . like the sticker 
price for cars: only an ignorant, ill-advised consumer would view full price as the norm and anything 
less as a bargain.”); William Ortman, Second-Best Criminal Justice, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1061, 1071 
n.52 (2019) (“[I]n a world where more than 95% of convictions are the result of guilty pleas, it seems 
farfetched to suppose that post-trial sentences provide the appropriate normative baseline.”). 
 101. See, e.g., William Braniff, Local Discretion, Prosecutorial Choices and the Sentencing 
Guidelines, 5 FED. SENT’G REP. 309, 310 (1993) (describing how a former U.S. Attorney explained that 
he chose to address high caseloads through “flexible use of the prosecutor’s traditional charging 
discretion as well as being flexible on sentencing in disposing of some cases” because “some 
prosecution was better than none, even if it meant the maximum sentence under the guidelines was not 
achievable in all cases”). 
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unnecessary, but it is also compelling with respect to many violent 
crimes that are punished with prison sentences that are likely far too 
long. I am deeply sympathetic towards this view,102 but many people 
are not. And resting a test of trial penalties on such a heavy 
assumption would exclude many readers—particularly those who 
believe that the pretrial differential represents a discount rather than a 
penalty. 
Only one quantitative study, published in 2019, goes further than 
measuring the plea-trial differential, but the results are quite 
limited.103 The study estimates the average plea-trial differential and 
the average trial acquittal rates for forty different kinds of crimes in 
the State of New York.104 It then creatively tests for evidence of trial 
penalties by calculating the correlation between the average plea-trial 
differential of those forty crimes and their respective acquittal rates 
under the assumption that, if the plea-trial differential represents a 
penalty, cases with stronger evidence would have smaller 
differentials.105 Due to the study’s research design, which necessarily 
involves a small sample size of just forty observations, it is unable to 
detect any statistically significant results.106 The design also relies on 
several relatively heavy assumptions, including that: (1) a model fit 
on sentences from cases resolved by guilty plea can be used to 
estimate the counterfactual sentence that would have been imposed if 
the case had gone to trial (and vice versa); (2) the acquittal rate at 
trial for a given crime type is indicative of the level of evidence in 
cases of that type that are resolved by guilty plea; and, most 
importantly, (3) other than the level of evidence available, no other 
differences between the forty different kinds of crimes are 
responsible for the differences in the plea-trial differential. But the 
 
 102. See Ben Grunwald, How to Reduce the Prison Population by X% (Jan. 7, 2021) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
 103. See generally Shi Yan & Shawn D. Bushway, Plea Discounts or Trial Penalties? Making Sense 
of the Trial-Plea Sentence Disparities, 35 JUST. Q. 1226 (2019). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 1241–42. 
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study is nonetheless a valuable advancement over prior work that 
exclusively examines the plea-trial differential. 
Taken together, unless we accept the heavy assumption that the 
plea sentence is equal to (or greater than) the baseline sentence, the 
available systematic empirical evidence provides little to distinguish 
between discounts and penalties. As noted, the strongest support for 
the trial penalty theory arises both from a compelling theoretical 
argument that prosecutors have the institutional capacity and 
incentives to inflict penalties and from the many documented cases in 
which prosecutors’ behavior strongly implies a penalty. But, from 
this alone, it’s hard to draw firm conclusions about the magnitude or 
prevalence of trial penalties more generally. In the next Part, I 
grapple with that problem directly. 
III. DISTINGUISHING PROSECUTORIAL BEHAVIOR UNDER THE 
DISCOUNT AND PENALTY THEORIES 
To distinguish between discounts and penalties (without assuming 
that the plea sentence is equal to or greater than the normative 
baseline), the discount and penalty theories need to make different 
predictions about prosecutorial behavior. As I’ve noted, a substantial 
number of criminal law scholars and jurists maintain that’s 
impossible, believing that discounts and penalties are merely two 
sides of the same coin. 107  That view, I believe, is based on the 
assumption that the only way to examine penalties and discounts is, 
as noted, how nearly all the studies to date have done so—by 
comparing sentences conditional on the stage of disposition. In this 
Part, I argue that this way of thinking about discounts and penalties is 
mistaken. We can make more progress in our search for empirical 
evidence of penalties and discounts by looking elsewhere—not by 
comparing the sentence of a defendant conditional on the stage of 
disposition—but instead by holding fixed the stage of disposition and 
by comparing the sentence of a defendant conditional on other factors 
 
 107. See sources cited supra note 5. 
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that affect the size of the penalty or discount. In other words, we 
should compare the sentences of two similar defendants who, for 
example, both plead guilty (or both go to trial), but who do so under 
conditions in which other relevant factors vary. 
What might those factors be? The academic literature suggests that 
prosecutors have two key motivations to use discounts and penalties: 
conserving litigation costs and avoiding the risk of trial acquittal.108 
When these two variables change, the discount and penalty theories’ 
predictions about prosecutorial behavior diverge from each other. 
A. Litigation Costs 
Consider litigation costs first. Suppose a prosecutor has limited 
resources and that trials are expensive. Suppose further that, given 
the limited resources, the prosecutor can only prosecute a fraction of 
all crimes. Under these circumstances, guilty pleas are more 
attractive than trials. 
The prosecution has two techniques to obtain more guilty pleas. 
First, it can offer a larger plea discount. The discount theory predicts 
the prosecution will decrease the defendant’s sentence based on the 
level of resources the defendant saved the government by pleading 
guilty rather than forcing the government to obtain a conviction 
through trial. Second, the prosecution can threaten a larger trial 
penalty. The penalty theory predicts the prosecution will increase the 
sentence based on the level of resources the defendant forced the 
prosecution to expend to secure the conviction. 
 
 108. See e.g., HEUMANN, supra note 23 (reporting on the results of a qualitative study of prosecutors’ 
adaptation to plea bargaining); J. Vincent Aprile II, Judicial Imposition of the Trial Tax, 29 CRIM. JUST. 
30, 30 (2014) (“Trial tax is a euphemism for a judge imposing a more severe sentence on a defendant, in 
whole or in part, because the accused, who elected to reject the prosecution’s plea agreement and go to 
trial, wasted judicial and prosecutorial resources involved in a trial.”); Alschuler, Prosecutor’s Role, 
supra note 68, at 55 (“A Manhattan prosecutor sa[id], ‘Our office keeps eight court rooms extremely 
busy trying 5% of the cases. If even ten per cent of the cases ended in a trial, the system would break 
down. We can’t afford to think very much about anything else.’ . . . [An] Assistant District Attorney in 
Charge of the Litigation Division in Philadelphia, sa[id], ‘The first question I ask myself in deciding 
what to do for a defendant who might plead guilty is, “How much time will I have to spend in the 
courtroom on this case?”’”). 
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The discount and penalty theories sound similar, almost mirror 
images of each other, but they make different predictions when 
litigation costs vary. Suppose that D1 is charged with robbery. If he 
pleads guilty, he will receive a sentence of seven years and, if 
convicted at trial, he will receive ten. Now, suppose we fast-forward 
in time to a period in which the costs of going to trial increase for the 
prosecution. Suppose further that, at this time, D2 commits the same 
crime as D1, and the prosecution files the same charges. Thus, the 
two cases are identical in all relevant respects except that D2’s case 
would be more expensive for the prosecution to take to trial. 
Because of the hike in litigation costs, the discount and penalty 
theories make different predictions about the defendants’ sentences. 
To see how, we need to compare the sentences of D1 and D2 
conditional on the same stage of disposition. Let’s assume they both 
plead guilty early in the criminal process, long before each side 
begins preparing for trial.109 What does the discount theory predict 
will happen to D2? Recall that, under the discount theory, the 
prosecution decreases a defendant’s sentence based on the amount of 
resources the defendant saves the prosecution. If D2 pleads guilty, 
D2 will save the prosecution even more resources than D1 would by 
pleading guilty because the costs of trial are higher when D2 is 
charged. As a result, the discount theory predicts that D2 receives an 
even lower sentence than the seven years that D1 received. D2 might, 
for example, get five years. 
Now, what does the penalty theory predict will happen to D2? 
Recall that, under the penalty theory, the prosecution increases a 
defendant’s sentence based on the amount of resources the defendant 
forces the prosecution to expend for the conviction. If D2 pleads 
guilty at precisely the same moment early in the criminal process as 
D1, then they both force the prosecution to expend the same amount 
of resources for their respective convictions. That’s because both 
defendants have pled guilty at the same early moment in the 
 
 109. For an undeveloped sketch of this idea, specifically for defendants who plead guilty, see 
Grunwald, supra note 35, at 804. 
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litigation—long before trial, when, I have posited, the costs of 
litigation in the two cases diverge. The penalty theory therefore 
predicts that D1 and D2 receive the same sentence of seven years. 
The key point is this: the penalty theory here predicts seven years for 
D2, whereas the discount theory predicts five. 
The discount and penalty theories also make different predictions 
if we assume both D1 and D2 go to trial rather than plead guilty. 
Under the discount theory, if D1 and D2 are both convicted at trial, 
they will receive the same sentence of ten years regardless of the 
difference in prosecutorial litigation costs. That’s because both have 
helped the prosecution avert the same amount of litigation costs: 
zero. But under the penalty theory, if D1 and D2 both go to trial, D2 
should receive a higher sentence than D1—say, twelve years—
because D2 has forced the prosecution to expend more resources to 
convict him (because of the higher litigation costs of trial in his case). 
The key takeaway is that, if both defendants are convicted at trial, the 
discount theory predicts that D2 will receive a sentence of ten years, 
whereas the penalty theory predicts that D2 will receive twelve. The 
two theories thus make different predictions about prosecutorial 
behavior when litigation costs vary. 
B. Risk of Acquittal 
Next, consider varying the risk of acquittal at trial. Suppose a 
prosecutor has infinite resources and is, therefore, unconcerned about 
litigation costs. Instead, she is primarily concerned about losing 
cases. Her primary goal, therefore, is to secure a conviction on at 
least one charge to avoid a total loss. For that reason, guilty pleas are 
more attractive than trials. 
As before, the prosecutor has two techniques to obtain more guilty 
pleas. First, to encourage defendants with lower conviction 
probabilities to plead guilty, the prosecutor can offer a larger plea 
discount. Thus, the discount theory predicts that prosecutors decrease 
the sentences of defendants who plead guilty as the risk of conviction 
at trial decreases. This is, essentially, the premise of the standard 
shadow-of-trial model—that prosecutors calibrate plea sentences 
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downwards based on the probability of conviction at trial. Second, to 
encourage defendants with lower conviction probabilities to plead 
guilty, the prosecutor can threaten a larger trial penalty. The penalty 
theory predicts that the prosecutor will increase the sentences of 
defendants who go to trial as the risk of conviction decreases. 
To examine how the discount and penalty theories play out, let’s 
return to D1 and D2. Recall that D1 would receive seven years if he 
pleads guilty and ten if he is convicted at trial. This time, assume 
both cases are identical in all respects except that the probability of 
conviction is, for whatever reason, lower for D2—perhaps because 
there was a change in the burdens of proof. 
The discount and penalty theories make different predictions about 
how the prosecutor responds to the drop in the probability of 
conviction. Once again, we need to compare the defendants’ 
sentences conditional on the same stage of disposition. Assume, then, 
that they both plead guilty. What does the discount theory predict? 
As the probability of conviction at trial falls, the prosecution 
decreases the sentence of a defendant who pleads guilty. Therefore, if 
both defendants plead guilty, the prosecutor responds to the decrease 
in the probability of conviction by seeking a lower sentence against 
D2 than D1—perhaps five years. In contrast, what does the penalty 
theory predict? As the probability of conviction at trial decreases, the 
prosecutor seeks higher sentences against defendants who go to trial. 
Because we have assumed that neither defendant goes to trial, the 
drop in the probability of conviction has no effect on D2’s sentence, 
meaning both defendants receive the same sentence of seven years. 
The key takeaway is that the discount and penalty theories make 
different predictions about D2’s sentence when the probability of 
conviction changes. If we assume both defendants plead guilty, the 
discount theory predicts that D2 gets a smaller sentence than D1, 
whereas the penalty theory predicts they get the same sentence. 
The discount and penalty theories also make different predictions 
about the defendants’ sentences if we assume both go to trial. Under 
the discount theory, if both defendants go to trial, they receive the 
same sentence. But under the penalty theory, the prosecutor seeks to 
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avoid risky trials and thus pressures defendants with lower conviction 
probabilities to plead guilty by increasing the trial sentence. Thus, 
under the penalty theory, the prosecution responds to the drop in the 
probability of conviction by seeking a higher sentence against D2 
than D1. Once again, the takeaway is that the discount and penalty 
theories predict different sentences for D2. If we assume both 
defendants go to trial, the discount theory predicts D2 will receive the 
same sentence as D1, whereas the penalty theory predicts that D2 
will receive a higher sentence. 
C. Implications 
My claim that the penalty and discount theories make different 
predictions about prosecutorial behavior has at least two 
implications—one theoretical, the other empirical. First, the 
theoretical implication is that plea discounts and trial penalties are 
not merely two sides of the same coin. Their predictions diverge 
when trial costs or acquittal risks vary. Under the discount theory, for 
example, when trial costs go up, defendants who plead guilty early in 
the criminal process receive lower sentences. But, under the penalty 
theory, those same defendants experience no change in sentences. 
Second, the empirical implication is that these diverging 
predictions may provide an opportunity to devise a test of plea 
discounts and trial penalties. Indeed, if prosecutors respond to rising 
litigation costs by decreasing plea sentences and leaving trial 
sentences unchanged, that provides meaningful evidence that their 
behavior is consistent with the plea discount theory. On the other 
hand, if they respond by leaving plea sentences unchanged and by 
increasing trial sentences, that’s consistent with the trial penalty 
theory. Moreover, the inference to trial penalties is even stronger 
with one relatively light assumption—that, before the rise in 
litigation costs, the trial sentence was equal to (or greater than) the 
baseline sentence. If that assumption holds, then any increase in trial 
sentences due to the rise in litigation costs would necessarily exceed 
the baseline and would, in turn, represent strong evidence of a trial 
penalty. Note that this assumption is far milder than the heavy 
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assumption required to infer penalties from existing studies on the 
plea-trial differential—to infer trial penalties in that literature, we 
must assume that the plea sentence is equal to (or greater than) the 
baseline sentence. 110  In the next Part, I consider how we might 
translate these theoretical insights into an empirical study. 
IV. DESIGNING AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF PLEA DISCOUNTS AND TRIAL 
PENALTIES 
In this Part, I explore whether and how empirical scholars might 
use the theoretical predictions identified in the previous Part to devise 
a test of the plea discount and trial penalty theories. I focus primarily 
on the predictions associated with litigation costs because they are 
easier to exploit empirically. 
To devise a test of discounts and penalties, we need a policy 
intervention that substantially changes the litigation costs of 
prosecution. Although there are others,111 one potential candidate is 
open-file discovery, which several states have adopted in recent 
years, including North Carolina and Texas.112 Open-file substantially 
increases discovery burdens on prosecutors. 113  In certain 
jurisdictions, it requires them to assemble all of the relevant evidence 
available to all relevant government agencies in every criminal 
case—substantially more evidence in far more cases than would be 
required under a traditional criminal discovery statute or the U.S. 
Constitution.114 
 
 110. See discussion supra Section II.D. 
 111. Other policy changes that may affect prosecutorial trial costs, at least in certain cases, include 
cost-shifting statutes, see, e.g., Recoupment of Costs Incurred in Prosecution of Convicted Criminal 
Defendant, Op. Wash. Att’y Gen. No. 14 (1976), 1976 WL 168498 (“[C]osts incurred at public expense 
for the payment of appointed counsel for the defendant in a criminal case as well as witness fees paid by 
the state for its own and defendant’s witnesses may be recovered pursuant to court order from the 
defendant if convicted.”), or other procedural rule changes, see, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 
557 U.S. 305, 329 (2009) (granting defendants the constitutional right to cross examine a forensic 
analyst who performed a test introduced at trial by the prosecution). 
 112. Grunwald, supra note 35, at 789 & n.88. 
 113. See id. at 789–91, 795–96. 
 114. Id. at 789–91. 
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To test the discount and penalties theories, we would need to 
compare the sentences of similar defendants whose cases were 
resolved at the same stage in the criminal process before and after the 
enactment of open-file discovery. For example, we could first 
examine the sentences of defendants who plead guilty early (before 
the prosecution produces the discovery file). As noted, all else being 
equal, if the discount theory is correct, we would expect those 
sentences to go down after open-file goes into effect, and if the 
penalty theory is correct, we would expect no change at all. 
Next, we could also compare the sentences of defendants who did 
receive discovery before and after open-file went into effect. We 
might, for example, look at the defendants convicted at trial. All else 
being equal, if the discount theory is correct, we would expect no 
change in those defendants’ sentences after open-file goes into effect. 
But, if the penalty theory is correct, we would expect those sentences 
to increase. 
Note that this approach might provide some information not only 
about the size of the additional discount or penalty in response to the 
change in litigation costs but also the prevalence of such responses. 
Information on the size of the additional discounts and penalties 
could be inferred by the average difference between sentences before 
and after open-file goes into effect. And information about 
prevalence might be captured by examining other characteristics of 
the distribution of sentences, like the spread as measured by the 
standard deviation. If the average trial sentence increases after 
open-file discovery goes into effect but the standard deviation does 
not, that would suggest that trial sentences went up uniformly. If, on 
the other hand, trial sentences increase but only for a fraction of 
cases, we would also expect to see an increase in the standard 
deviation. Assuming sufficient sample sizes, we might also be able to 
identify specific prosecutors offices that respond to the change in 
litigation costs more aggressively with discounts and penalties than 
other offices by subsetting the analysis by county. 
Of course, there are a number of potential methodological 
limitations or challenges. First, like every empirical study examining 
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the effect of judicial reforms, ideally, the policy change would occur 
at a time when no other major changes are occurring in the criminal 
justice system. For example, in a study of just one or two counties, 
one might be particularly concerned about turnover in key personnel 
such as a judge, district attorney, or chief of the criminal division in 
the district attorney’s office. In a statewide study, which has the 
advantage of averaging across these kinds of county-level 
idiosyncratic changes, one might still be concerned about relevant 
legislative enactments, changes in criminal justice funding levels, and 
the timing of local elections. Relatedly, changes in the composition 
of the caseload or the timing of disposition might also be a concern. 
Fortunately, the data we have on open-file provides little evidence of 
a compositional change, 115 and there are useful statistical tools to 
help address this kind of problem.116 
Second, open-file discovery might affect sentences through an 
alternative causal pathway other than increased litigation costs. If so, 
that alternative pathway could bias an estimate of the effect of 
increased litigation costs. The most plausible alternative pathway is 
that open-file may reduce sentences by helping defendants develop a 
more effective litigation strategy—whether during plea bargaining or 
trial. Let’s call this the effective defense pathway, to distinguish it 
from the litigation cost pathway. 
This alternative pathway is a real methodological concern, but it 
might be smaller than it appears at first. For one thing, if open-file 
promotes more effective defense strategy, that would only make the 
trial penalty test more conservative. If, as the penalty theory predicts, 
sentences go up for trial convictions after open-file goes into effect—
and they do so despite the potential downward bias from more 
 
 115. Id. at 810–23. 
 116. Most importantly, we can test for changes in the volume of cases at different phases of the 
criminal process. If, for example, open-file leads some cases to a plea agreement that otherwise would 
have gone to trial, we could likely detect that change by looking for increases in the proportion of cases 
that are pled out. We can also test for changes in observable case characteristics—such as charges, 
criminal history, and defendant demographics. Furthermore, if there are compositional changes, 
multivariate regression could help adjust for some of them by controlling for observable case 
characteristics. 
40
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 4
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss2/4
2021] DISTINGUISHING PLEA DISCOUNTS AND TRIAL PENALTIES 301 
effective defense—that would suggest the increased litigation costs 
of open-file led to an even bigger trial penalty than observed in the 
study. The same is true for defendants who plead guilty early, and for 
whom the trial penalty theory predicts no change. If the study 
observes no change, then we probably do not need to worry about the 
effective defense pathway. 
The problem is bigger for the discount theory, which predicts that 
defendants who plead guilty before the prosecution produces 
discovery receive lower sentences after open-file goes into effect. If 
sentences go down for those defendants, we won’t know whether that 
reduction is the result of heightened litigation costs or a more 
effective defense. One potential solution is to lean more heavily on 
the plea discount theory’s prediction for defendants convicted at 
trial—that defendants convicted at trial experience no change in 
sentences after open-file goes into effect. If sentences do not change, 
that would provide support for the discount theory without raising 
concerns about the alternative causal pathway of effective defense. 
A third methodological challenge, which is perhaps better 
described as a methodological limitation, is that this test cannot 
detect trial penalties under certain conditions. For example, if a 
prosecutor has already maxed out on penalties before open-file goes 
into effect—meaning the prosecutor already inflicts the largest 
penalty possible in all cases—then the policy change cannot lead the 
prosecutor to increase penalties further. Similarly, when applying a 
test of trial penalties based on changes in litigation costs, we would 
not be able to pick up trial penalties based on the other motivations to 
plea bargain, like avoiding the chance of acquittal at trial. 
A fourth methodological challenge—this one specific to the 
open-file context—is a measurement problem: we need to know 
whether individual cases were resolved before or after the 
prosecution has invested resources in discovery. For cases that go to 
trial, this is easy; the prosecution almost certainly invested significant 
resources in assembling and compiling a discovery package for the 
defense. But for cases resolved earlier in the criminal process, 
measuring discovery is harder. 
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There are a few potential solutions. One option is to use timing as 
a rough proxy for the prosecution’s investment in discovery. 
Criminal court databases usually contain information on the date 
charges were filed and the date the defendant entered a guilty plea. 
At least in some jurisdictions, it may be reasonable to assume that the 
prosecution has not invested significant resources into discovery in 
cases where the defendant pled guilty soon after charges were filed. 
That inference may be particularly strong in certain classes of cases. 
In North Carolina, for example, defendants sometimes waive 
discovery in low-level felony drug cases that are resolved early in the 
criminal process before they reach felony court. 117  It might be 
possible to compare, before and after open-files goes into effect, the 
sentences in the subset of these low-level drug cases that are resolved 
early. It may similarly be possible to compare, before and after 
open-file goes into effect, the sentences in low-level drug cases that 
are resolved later in the criminal process after discovery is provided 
in superior court. Another option is to gather case-level data on 
discovery itself. Some public defender offices, for example, maintain 
a discovery log that captures basic information like the case number, 
the date of receipt, and the number of pages or boxes in the discovery 
file.118 Such logs could be used to measure whether a defendant has 
received discovery before the case is resolved, which may be a strong 
proxy for how much labor the prosecution has invested. 
As these methodological challenges reveal, implementing a 
rigorous test of the discount and penalty theories is no easy task. But 
the challenges seem worth the potential payoff—the chance to 
systematically test the discount and penalty theories in action using 
data from a large and representative sample of criminal cases. 
 
 117. E-mail from Thomas Maher, Former Exec. Dir., N. Carolina Indigent Defense Servs., to author 
(Jan. 7, 2021) (on file with author). 
 118. Grunwald, supra note 35, at 827. 
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CONCLUSION 
Criminal law scholars have worried about the coercive effects of 
trial penalties on plea bargaining for over half a century.119 Yet we 
still have little systematic empirical evidence to determine the 
prevalence and intensity of the problem. More work—both 
theoretical and empirical—needs to be done. My hope is that, armed 
with more precise criteria for distinguishing between discounts and 
penalties and with more discriminating statistical tests, it will be 
easier to go out into the world and generate evidence about them. 
Before concluding, it is worth pausing for a brief moment to reflect 
on COVID-19. This Article was written and accepted for publication 
well before 2020—it is, therefore, written for non-pandemic times. 
But much of the basic logic and analysis remains intact. What has 
arguably changed is the normative baseline. Due to the heightened 
health risks of incarceration, many crimes that were suitably 
punished with prison before the pandemic no longer are.120 In other 
words, for many crimes, the normative baseline for incarceration has 
fallen to zero. In those cases, my analysis implies that any increased 
prison time that defendants receive because they were convicted at 
trial (rather than through a guilty plea) qualifies as a trial penalty. 
This means that, under pandemic conditions, trial penalties are far 
larger, more frequent, and easier to detect, at least in those crimes for 
which prison time is no longer appropriate. 
 
 
 119. See, e.g., Dominick R. Vetri, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure 
Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 886 (1964) (noting that “a prosecutor should not include 
additional charges merely to bring pressure on a defendant to plead guilty”). 
 120. E.g., Cary Aspinwall, These Prisons Are Doing Mass Testing for COVID-19, THE MARSHALL 
PROJECT (Apr. 24, 2020, 5:32 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/04/24/these-prisons-are-
doing-mass-testing-for-covid-19-and-finding-mass-infections [https://perma.cc/CM6E-9PNJ]. 
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